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Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have
Contributed to International Human Rights Lawt
S. James Anaya*
The interests of Native Americans have long been ignored, or
worse. The history of misdealing and atrocities committed against
Native Americans ever since Christopher Columbus found himself on
a Caribbean island, miscalculated his location, and called his hosts
"Indians" is well known. Much less widely known are the present day
legacies of this sad history. The American myth of the "vanishing
savage," a myth created to embolden white settlement of the country,
has only partially been embraced by reality. Although vastly reduced
in numbers, and concentrated in pockets of relative geographic
isolation called reservations, the country's indigenous peoples are
still here.
For the country's indigenous peoples, historical acts of oppression
are not just blemishes of the past but rather translate into current
inequities. Like other indigenous peoples around the world, Native
Americans have been deprived of vast landholdings and access to
life-sustaining resources and they have suffered historical forces that
have actively suppressed their political and cultural institutions. As a
result, indigenous peoples have been crippled economically and
socially, their cohesiveness as communities has been damaged or
threatened, and the integrity of their cultures has been undermined.
According to every measure, Native Americans as a whole are at the
lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder and they exist at the
margins of political power.
t This paper was prepared from a speech given at Washington University in St. Louis
School of Law as part of the Public Interest Law Speakers Series. Minimal footnotes have been
added by the author.
* James J. Lenoir Professor of Human Rights Law and Policy, University of Arizona
Rogers College of Law.
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Nevertheless, in the face of tremendous adversity, indigenous
peoples have long sought not just to survive physically but to flourish
as distinct communities on their ancestral territories. They have
endeavored to roll back the inequities that linger from the experiences
of the past. This "blood struggle," as Charles Wilkinson calls it, is
one that draws its major source of strength from the remarkable
resilience of Native Americans and the cultural and social patterns
that bind them into communities.' Drawing on this strength, Native
Americans have employed a number of strategies, including those
that enlist the law and the legal process, as agents of change. The
limitations of the United States' legal order, however, have all too
often become apparent. Within the architecture of the domestic legal
order doctrines derived from colonial era practice continue to rear
their heads and impede the reversal of the status quo left by the
colonizing process.
Faced with legal and political barriers in the United States, Native
Americans, like indigenous peoples elsewhere, have extended their
legal advocacy into the international arena. Over the last three
decades especially, they have been appealing to the international
community and looking to international law to advance their claims.
However, international law has its own set of limitations.
International law is a body of transnational rules and procedures,
linked to international institutions, in which states are the primary
actors. Historically, international law can be seen as complicit in
patterns of colonization, ultimately upholding the sovereignty
asserted by colonizing states over indigenous peoples and their lands.
But things change.
A good deal of scholarly energy has gone into examining the
changing character of international law, especially in light of
phenomena such as the creation of the United Nations (UN) to
formalize a constitutional order of multilateralism and global
cooperation, and the introduction of a normative foundation of peace
and security for that order. Related to these phenomena, and
contributing to among the most radical changes in the character of
international law over the past century, is the development of an




international human rights regime. The growth of this regime takes
international law beyond its traditional focus on the rights and duties
of states, establishes an international legal competency over matters
once deemed within the exclusive domain of states, and provides
individuals and other non-state actors access, albeit limited, to
avenues of international legal process.
The remarks that follow summarize how the claims of indigenous
peoples have not only taken advantage of changes in the character of
international law but have also contributed to those changes,
particularly in the area of human rights. These changes are beneficial
not just for indigenous peoples themselves but the humanity more
broadly. Part I describes the nature of disparate international legal
arguments employed by indigenous peoples and how those arguments
have tended toward a human rights discourse. Part II discusses
specific ways in which the indigenous human rights discourse has
contributed to the evolution of international human rights law.
I. Two FRAMEWORKS OF ARGUMENT USED BY ADVOCATES
There have been significant advances in international law in favor
of indigenous peoples over the last two to three decades. These
advances are largely the result of indigenous peoples' own resilient
efforts, both domestically and through international channels.
Without the resilient efforts by indigenous peoples themselves-
people from the grass roots, their leaders, and their elders-these
advances would not have occurred. There are two principal
frameworks of argument used by advocates in the effort to use
international law in favor of indigenous peoples: the states rights
framework and the human rights framework. Of these two the human
rights framework is that which has yielded the most favorable results
for indigenous peoples over the last several decades.
A. The States Rights Framework
One strain of argument has been within the classical state-centered
framework of international law developed in Europe from the
seventeenth century onward, along with the institution of the modern
state. Within this frame of argument, indigenous peoples have been
referred to as "nations" and identified as having attributes of
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"sovereignty" that predate and, at least to some extent, should trump
the sovereignty of states that now assert power over them. The
rhetoric of nationhood is used to posit indigenous peoples as states, or
something like states, within a post-Westphalian world of separate,
mutually exclusive political communities. Advocates for indigenous
peoples point to a history in which "original" sovereignty of
indigenous communities over defined territories has been
illegitimately taken from them or suppressed. The rules of
international law that developed in the nineteenth century relating to
the acquisition and transfer of territory by and among states are
invoked to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the assault on indigenous
sovereignty.
While appealing to many, this strain of argument must confront
international law's strong historical doctrinal tendency, precisely at
its height in the nineteenth century, to view as unqualified for
statehood non-European indigenous peoples and instead to favor the
consolidation of power over them by the European states and their
colonial offspring. This argument is also strongly resisted by
contemporary international norms of state sovereignty, which have
survived robustly from historical doctrine and through existing
political configurations that favor the sovereignty of already widely
recognized states to the exclusion of any competing sovereignty.
B. The Human Rights Framework
The second strain of argument used by indigenous rights
advocates over the last few decades centers around the international
system's embrace of human rights. Indigenous peoples have seized
upon the institutional and normative regime of human rights that was
brought within the fold of international law in the aftermath of World
War II and the adoption of the UN Charter. Much like the moral
discourse engaged in by pre-nineteenth-century theorists who are
associated with the early development of international law and who
questioned the legality of colonial patterns, the contemporary human
rights discourse has the welfare of human beings as its subject and is
concerned only secondarily, if at all, with the interests of sovereign
entities. Within the human rights framework, indigenous peoples are
groups of human beings with fundamental human rights concerns that
[Vol. 22:107
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deserve attention. Historical events are indeed relevant, but that
relevance is measured as the extent to which history accounts for the
conditions of present day oppression and inequities that affect the
lives of indigenous human beings and their communities.
Responding to indigenous peoples' demands is a human rights
imperative that is now widely recognized within the international
system. With this recognition has come a sustained level of
international institutional activity focused upon indigenous peoples'
concerns and a corresponding body of norms that build upon long-
standing human rights precepts. This regime is in tension with
notions of state sovereignty that continue as central to the
international system and that generally blunt international concern
over human rights; it also challenges the human rights system's
traditional focus on the rights of individuals rather than on the
collective rights of groups. Nonetheless, an indigenous rights regime
has developed and it continues to evolve within international law's
human rights program in ways that are in some measure favorable to
indigenous peoples' demands.
II. FOUR FRONTS OF CHANGE
Indigenous peoples are not just prompting changes in international
law, in particular human rights law, that are focused on their
demands; they are forging changes in fundamental aspects of the
international legal system that apply more broadly. These changes
can be seen along the following four fronts.
A. The Move Toward Collective Rights
Indigenous peoples have helped forge new ground within the
human rights regime of international law by moving it to embrace
collective human rights. Until recently, the focus of the international
human rights regime has been almost entirely on the rights of the
individual against the state, without much attention to the collective
and associational dimensions of human existence beyond the state.
Bypassing the individual/state dichotomy of rights and duties,
indigenous peoples have claimed and articulated their human rights
in terms of group or collective rights. In multiple written and oral
statements to international audiences, indigenous leaders and
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representatives have provided lucid explanations and illustrations,
detailing the convincing justifications for collective human rights that
have seemingly eluded the academic elite. The international system is
increasingly embracing the ideal of collective rights for indigenous
peoples and not just the individual rights of members of indigenous
communities. In doing so, the international system has acclimated
itself to collective rights in a way that has potentially broad
implications beyond simply the context of indigenous peoples.
Existing and proposed international written instruments have
affirmed the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Already one
international treaty, International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention Number 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples ("the
Convention"),2 affirms an array of rights belonging to "indigenous
peoples" and not just rights belonging to individuals who happen to
be digenous. In the Convention a savings clause is attached to the
usage of the term "peoples" to avoid implications regarding self-
determination, but that in no way undermines the collective nature of
the rights affirmed.3 The titleholders of rights within this convention
are peoples; that means indigenous groups are deemed to have
collective rights in relation to their lands, the maintenance and
development of their cultures, their own institutions of self-
governance, and their own laws and customs. This multilateral treaty
is binding on nearly every country in the Western Hemisphere.
(Among the exceptions are the United States and Canada, which have
not ratified the treaty.) Likewise, collective human rights are
articulated in both the draft of the UN declaration on the rights of
indigenous peoples and the proposed Organization of American
States' (OAS) declaration on indigenous rights.4 These proposed
declarations affirm a series of rights of indigenous peoples, including
the same kind of rights affirmed by the Convention, though in much
2. International Labor Organization, Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, available at http://www.uhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/62.htm (entered into force Sept. 5, 1990).
3. Id. art. 1, § 3.
4. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR,
Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994); Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 1333d Sess., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997).
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more sweeping terms. It is therefore likely that these declarations,
once approved, will provide greater recognition for indigenous
peoples' collective rights than the Convention.
Also relevant is the practice of important international human
rights bodies, including the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, each of which has
referred to indigenous "peoples" as holders or beneficiaries of rights.
Although many states have resisted usage of the term "peoples"
without the kind of qualifier that appears in the Convention, that
resistance generally indicates opposition toward a recognition of
indigenous collective rights. The trend that can be seen among states
participating in international discussions about indigenous rights is to
accord legal entitlements to indigenous peoples as collective entities.
This international practice is also consistent with the trend in the
domestic laws of virtually every state that admits to having
indigenous groups within its borders, including virtually all of the
American states.
Important with regard to collective rights are recent decisions of
the inter-American human rights institutions in the cases concerning
the Awas Tingni community in Nicaragua, the Western Shoshone
people in the United States, and the Maya people in Belize.5 These
decisions each explicitly affirm the collective rights of indigenous
peoples over their lands and resources on the basis of international
legal instruments that only recognize individual rights. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights interpreted individual rights, such as the right
to property, in the context of indigenous peoples' claims. These
institutions held that property rights arise not just within state legal
systems, but also within the traditional land-tenure systems of
indigenous peoples. These rights arise from the collective interaction
5. See Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2002 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001); Mary and Carrie Dann, Case 11.140, Inter-Am
C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.LV/I1. 117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002); Case of Maya Indigenous
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
40/04, OEA/Ser.LN/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004).
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of indigenous communities and their members, and are therefore
collective rights.
These and other developments in international law indicate a
move toward the recognition of the collective rights of indigenous
peoples within the human rights framework of international law. This
important development in the structure of international human rights
law has relevance beyond simply the context of indigenous peoples
because it moves the international human rights system beyond the
individual/state dichotomy that has framed dominant understandings
about rights and duties under international law.
B. The Softening of State Sovereignty
A second, related way in which indigenous peoples have helped
change international law has to do with state sovereignty, which is
considered one of the bedrock doctrines of international law. The
doctrine of sovereignty traditionally has shielded states from scrutiny
over matters that are deemed to be within the realm of their domestic
concern. A good deal of scholarly commentary has been devoted to
identifying and explaining a weakening of the sovereignty shield over
the last several decades. This weakening is attributed substantially to
the international human rights regime that has developed since the
adoption of the UN Charter and that imposes, typically in favor of the
individual, external limitations on the exercise of state authority in
the domestic realm. Indigenous peoples' demands, which have been
deployed through the human rights regime, are resulting in a more
radical altering of the state sovereignty norm than the alteration
brought about by the internationalization of individual rights.
The assertion of such group rights challenges the primacy and
sphere of state governing authority in a much more fundamental
sense than classical individual rights. International norms have
developed and are further evolving to uphold the asserted group
rights manifested in the Convention and the drafts of the UN's and
OAS's declarations on indigenous rights. The weakening of the state
sovereignty shield in this regard is dramatically evident in recent
proceedings before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, and CERD in which states
have been called upon to answer for their promotion of natural
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resource development or land administration schemes regarding lands
claimed by indigenous peoples. These cases involve the assertion of
claims of indigenous peoples over natural resources on their
traditional lands.
For example, in the cases concerning the Mayas in Belize, the
Awas Tingni community in Nicaragua, and the Western Shoshone in
the United States, the main defense of the states concerned was that
the administration of lands and natural resources are matters that fall
within the sovereign discretion of the state. Belize, Nicaragua, and
the United States either explicitly or tacitly argued that it is up to the
state to decide how to distribute land, how to manage land, and how
to manage the natural resources. However, in the Awas Tingni case
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, joined by the
Inter-American Court in the Awas Tingni case, disagreed with that
position and saw that these questions were legitimate subjects of
international concern. The Commission affirmed the collective rights
of indigenous peoples over their lands and resources and held that the
United States, Belize and Nicaragua should adjust their laws and
policies regarding the administration of these lands and resources.
These cases illustrate how the international human rights system's
embrace of indigenous rights is pushing toward a softening of the
doctrine of state sovereignty.
C. Evolution of the Norm of Self-Determination
A third, and again related, area of change has to do with the
concept of self-determination. Self-determination is affirmed as a
principle in the UN Charter and as a right of "all peoples" in the
international human rights covenants. Much scholarly effort has gone
into trying to explain the meaning of the right of all peoples to self-
determination as a human right in the context of an international legal
order that presumptively upholds the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political unity of states. Typically, self-determination has been
understood to mean, in its fullest sense, a right to independent
statehood. Hence the central focus of inquiry has been on identifying
the necessarily limited universe of groups that are entitled to become
independent states if they so chose. A premise underlying this
approach is that the state is the highest form of self-determination for
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cultural or national communities. This premise is of course subject to
question, if only because of accelerating developments over the last
several decades by which the importance of the state has diminished
in light of the growth of both local and transnational spheres of
community and authority.
In pressing their demands internationally, indigenous peoples
have pointedly undermined the premise of the state as the highest and
most liberating form of human association. Indigenous peoples are
seen, and for the most part see themselves, as different from but not
inferior to states. The model that is emerging from the interplay of
indigenous demands and the authoritative responses to those demands
is one that sees indigenous peoples as simultaneously distinct from,
and yet parts of, the states within which they live, as well as part of
other units of social and political interaction that might include
indigenous federations or transnational associations. Within this
model, self-determination is achieved not by independent statehood,
but by the consensual development of context-specific arrangements
that uphold for indigenous peoples both spheres of autonomy
commensurate with relevant cultural patterns and rights of
participation in the political processes of the states in which they live.
Professor Erica-Irene Daes, the previous, long-time chair of the UN
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, has observed:
This [process] might best be described as a kind of "belated
State-building," through which indigenous peoples are able to
join with all the other peoples that make up the State on
mutually-agreed and just terms, after many years of isolation
and exclusion. This does not mean that assimilation of
indigenous individuals as citizens like all others, but the
recognition and incorporation of distinct peoples in the fabric
of the State, on agreed terms.6
A new conception of self-determination is emerging around
indigenous peoples' claim to self-determination that applies to
6. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Explanatory Note
Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at para. 26 (1993),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english (follow "Search" hyperlink; type "Erica-Irene A.
Daes" and "19 July 1993" in the search engine).
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claimants of self-determination across the globe beyond the specific
context of indigenous peoples. This new conception of self-
determination, reflected in the preamble of the UN Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, makes clear that the right
affirmed is not the right of indigenous peoples to secede from the
states within which they live. Rather, the new conception of self-
determination recognizes the freedom of individuals and groups to
form associations and to collectively pursue their own destinies under
conditions of equality within the framework of the states within
which they live.
The kind of particular arrangements needed to allow for this
conception self-determination will necessarily vary from case to case
and adapt to the specific context of individual indigenous groups. For
example, the Yanomami of the Amazon region of Brazil and the
Navajo people of southwestern United States exist under very
different economic, political, and geographic situations; therefore,
these groups will necessarily develop different kinds of structures to
accommodate their right of self-determination. Nevertheless, the
underlying norm reflecting the fundamental right of these groups is
the same: it is the right of each one to be in control of its own destiny.
This conception of self-determination assumes a more nuanced
character by taking into account the interdependencies that exist
among and between indigenous communities and the larger societies
within which they live. This substantial innovation in the doctrine of
self-determination moves beyond the classic understanding of self-
determination as wedded to a right of independent statehood, and has
implications far beyond the context of indigenous peoples.
D. The Role of Non-State Actors
Finally, another development promoted by the emergence of
indigenous peoples within the contemporary international legal
system has to do with the role of non-state actors. Actors other than
states have increasing influence within the international legal system,
particularly its human rights regime. Individuals themselves are
rights holders and have some access to the international system in
order to claim those rights. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
like Amnesty International influence the development of international
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law through advocacy efforts and consultative status with the UN's
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its subsidiary bodies.
Labor unions also have significant access to the international human
rights system, especially through the ILO. Private corporations are
increasingly scrutinized by international agencies and NGOs, and are
thus subjects of international concern. Therefore, the classic
understanding of the subjects of international law is breaking down.
Contemporary international legal discourse does not only involve the
examination of the rights of states and the duties of states. Rather,
there are multiple actors and an increasing number of rights holders
in the modem international system.
Indigenous peoples are among the numerous non-state actors that
have managed to take advantage of openings in the international
system and forge new ones in order to participate in and influence
decision-making processes that extend into the international arena.
For over two decades, representatives of indigenous peoples have
been appearing before UN human rights bodies in increasing
numbers and with increasing frequency. Indigenous peoples have
enhanced their access to these bodies as several organizations
representative of indigenous groups have achieved official
consultative status with the ECOSOC. In response to indigenous
peoples' efforts in particular, new institutions and programs have
developed that are providing them unique avenues of access to the
international system. Most notably among these are the UN's
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, the Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples,
and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Indigenous peoples
and their organizations have direct access to these agencies, and they
appear before them in their public sessions to make written or oral
submissions. Additionally, eight of the sixteen members of the
Permanent Forum are named by the ECOSOC President in
consultation with indigenous peoples, and this has resulted in those
eight being from indigenous constituencies.
The increasing access of indigenous peoples to the international
system is especially noteworthy in at least two respects. First, without
any political influence to speak of, indigenous peoples have been
successful in using the language and methods of human rights to
advance their demands. Grounding their demands in generally
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applicable human rights principles, they have used their access to the
international system to articulate a vision of themselves different
from that previously advanced and acted upon by dominant sectors,
and they have greatly influenced the international agenda of activities
that has proceeded in response to those demands. In a relatively short
time they have managed to shift prevailing attitudes away from a
norm of assimilation toward one of respect for indigenous cultures
and group identity. Even though this shift has not progressed
sufficiently to entirely satisfy most indigenous groups, and its
implementation on the ground has been slow to follow, the shift is
nonetheless clearly perceptible in the collective and individual
utterances by states and other actors, and in newly developed or still
developing written instruments.
Second, indigenous peoples appear to be gaining recognition as
having a unique or sui generis status among non-state actors within
the international arena. Associated with this unique status is an
enhanced level of participation. Indigenous peoples are unlike
ordinary nongovernmental organizations in that indigenous peoples
are not simply groups organized around particular interests. Rather,
indigenous peoples are by definition longstanding communities with
historically rooted cultures and distinct political and social
institutions. They seek to have a presence in their own right as
peoples in the international arena and not just as representatives of a
segment of so-called civil society. As already noted, within the UN
and other international institutions various extraordinary mechanisms
have been devised to allow representatives of indigenous peoples to
express their concerns and participate in discussions that affect them.
Indigenous peoples are unique among non-state actors. By gaining
a foothold in the international system, they are a significant force in
making that system less state-centered and more centered on human
beings in their multiple relevant configurations, a phenomenon with
broader implications.
CONCLUSION
Developments generated by indigenous peoples through a
discourse of human rights are having identifiable impacts on
international law, particularly human rights law, with implications for
2006]
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the larger international community. These developments are breaking
new ground on issues concerning collective rights, state sovereignty,
self-determination, and the role of non-state actors, with a central
feature being a challenge to the state as the sole or primary means of
locating power and community. Having asserted themselves in the
international arena, indigenous peoples have pursued a vision of a
normative universe that stands against forces of the kind that have
wreaked havoc on indigenous societies throughout history. In doing
so, indigenous communities are helping to bring about change in the
international legal order. This change just might help bring about a
more just and humane world, not only for indigenous peoples but for
all of humanity.
